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MISCELLANEOUS: ASSOCIATION OF COUNSEL 
  
Summary 
 
 The Court determined whether a district court may deny a motion to associate out-of-
state counsel who satisfy all of requirements of Nevada Supreme Court Rule 42.   
 
Disposition 
 
 In general, a district court reviewing a motion to associate out-of-state counsel should 
typically limit its analysis to the requirements for admission set forth in SCR 42.  Accordingly, a 
district court should not consider whether the out-of-state counsel would be more capable of 
handling the case than local counsel, or whether trial might be delayed if the motion is granted.  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Petitioners Imperial Credit Corporation and Thomas Vail were initially represented by 
Andrea Babero of Black & Lobello in the defense of a lawsuit filed by real parties in interest 
Leerad LP, Virginia Belt, and Patricia McGill.  A newly hired attorney was assigned to Imperial 
Credit’s case when Babero resigned his employment with Black & Lobello several months 
before the trial.  Imperial Credit retained out-of-state attorneys Cynthia G. Burnside and A. 
Andre Hendrick, who had previously handled similar cases for the company.   Burnside and 
Hendrick complied with SCR 42(3), (4)’s procedural requirements for out-of-state attorneys 
seeking admission to practice in Nevada courts, and Imperial Credit’s local counsel accordingly 
filed a district court motion to associate them.   
 However, the district court denied the motion without a hearing, citing only SCR 42(6), 
which gives district court’s the discretion to grant or deny a motion.  Reconsideration of the 
decision was denied, resulting in the emergency writ petition.  The Nevada Supreme Court 
granted extraordinary relief through an unpublished order; this decision explains that holding. 
 
Discussion 
 
Standard of Review 
 
An arbitrary or capricious exercise of a district court’s discretion can be controlled by a 
writ of mandamus.2  The Nevada Supreme Court may address a petition’s merits to clarify 
important issues.3  Here, a district court denying a motion to associate out-of-state counsel who 
satisfies all of SCR 42’s admission requirements constitutes an important legal issue needing 
clarification.  Thus, the Supreme Court considered the merits of the petition.  
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The Practice of Attorneys Not Admitted in Nevada 
 
 Imperial Credit argued that because out-of-state counsel met all the requirements for pro 
hac vice admission set forth in SCR 42, denying the motion to associate was improper.  The 
district court judge contended that Imperial Credit failed to prove that the out-of-state counsel 
would better represent it than would local counsel, and noted that allowing Imperial Credit to 
assert new counsel so soon before the trial would delay the trial. 
 SCR 42 authorizes out-of-state counsel to practice in Nevada’s courts through pro hac 
vice admission.  Attorneys licensed to practice law in a state other than Nevada can apply to the 
State Bar of Nevada for a limited admission to practice in a particular action pending in Nevada 
state courts.  The attorney must provide certificates of good standing from where the attorney has 
been admitted; information regarding the attorney’s disciplinary history; and whether the 
attorney has applied for pro hac vice admission in Nevada within the last three years.4 
 Although district courts have discretion to grant or deny motions to associate out-of-state 
counsel,5 importance is placed on allowing parties to be represented by the counsel of their 
choice.6  Thus, this case questions whether the district court may properly deny a motion to 
associate out-of-state counsel who has met all of the SCR 42 requirements.   
 The Court adopted the holding in THI Holdings, a Florida District Court of Appeals 
decision that addressed a trial court’s reliance on criteria not contained in Florida’s rule 
governing pro hac vice admission to deny a motion.7  In that case, the court noted that while 
district court judges have discretion to deny the motion, the ruling should still be based on 
matters appearing in the record before the court, such as information that calls into question the 
applicant’s admission to practice in other states or good standing.8  Therefore, extraordinary 
relief is warranted to rectify the district court’s denial of a motion to admit counsel to practice if 
the out-of-state counsel meets all the rule-based requirements for admission.9 
 The Court noted that in Nevada, the district court’s discretion is still subject to the test of 
reasonableness, requiring logic and justification for the result.10  Arbitrary, fanciful, or 
unreasonable discretion is improper and an abuse of discretion.  Thus, applying THI to this case, 
the Imperial Credit out-of-state attorneys met all of SCR 42’s admission requirements, were in 
good standing with their local state bars, had no disciplinary issues, and had not previously 
applied for pro hac vice admission in this state.11  However, the district court still denied 
Imperial Credit’s motion to associate the attorneys, citing a concern that granting the motion 
shortly before trial would delay resolution of the underlying case.12  The district court also 
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asserted that Imperial Credit had failed to demonstrate that out-of-state counsel was more 
capable of handling its case than local counsel.  These positions were misplaced, as they inserted 
reliance on factors outside SCR 42’s requirements, thus constituting an arbitrary and capricious 
exercise of the district court’s discretion.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The district court should have allowed Imperial Credit to associate its pro have vice 
counsel, as counsel met all of the requirements for admission.  Accordingly, denial of the motion 
was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion.  The Nevada Supreme Court granted the 
petition, and issued a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order and instead 
enter an order granting the motion to associate pro hac vice counsel. 
